"It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so"
Mark Twain
It is nearly a hundred years since the concept of the P-value entered medical statistics and was popularised for testing research hypotheses. In the time since, medical research has grown into big business with expenditure recently estimated at around $100 billion per year in the U.S. alone 1 . Such massive investment is reasonably expected to provide important and accurate answers that will guide medical decision-making to improve the care of individual patients, improve the health of the community and facilitate optimal use of limited healthcare resources. A research question typically begins with the formulation of a hypothesis for testing. After conducting the research, the generated data are then mathematically analysed to produce an output that leads to either acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis, in large part based on (some version of) the humble P-value. Such conclusions, whether based on one study or incremental additions to the literature, are then used to inform medical decisionmaking. Clearly a comprehensive understanding of what is required to accept or reject a hypothesis, including correct interpretation and use of the P-value, is essential to drawing statistically valid conclusions that underpin the value of medical research. So what then is required to allow a statistically valid conclusion of the superiority of one intervention over another in a clinical trial?
For many clinicians the P-value is the sine qua non of medical research. Values less than 0.05 represent 'truth', while values greater than this magical number represent ideas or concepts that may be rejected as false. Unfortunately, the truth is a much more complicated affair and much has been written, including recently, on correct use of the P-value in medical research. Put simply, the P-value is the probability that values equal to, or more extreme than, those observed in a given study occurred by chance alone, assuming that the null hypothesis is true. Historically a P-value <0.05 has been arbitrarily accepted as reasonable evidence against the null hypothesis. However, when taken in isolation, this may easily mislead the unwary investigator and reader alike. Instead, assuming that the study methodology is internally valid, rejection of the null hypothesis should only occur in the setting of a sufficiently low P-value, together with adequate pre-specified power and an observed effect size greater than or equal to a pre-specified clinically important value.
In this issue of Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, Gibbs and Weightman critique the statistical rigour underpinning the stated conclusions in 25 of the most cited randomised controlled trials (RCT) published through 2011 to 2012 in a selection of anaesthesia journals. They identify the five most cited RCTs from each of five well-known journals that reported one or more 'unconditional conclusions' of superiority of a tested clinical intervention. Each conclusion was then scrutinised for the P-value on which it was based, the point estimate of the observed effect size, the a priori power and the a priori definition of a clinically important effect size used to calculate the required sample size for the study. A conclusion was considered statistically valid if the P-value was less than the stated alpha value and the observed effect size was at least as large as that specified in the sample size calculation, using power 0.8 (80%). Conclusions supported by a P-value less than the stated alpha but not supported by the other requisite criteria were argued to be 'hypothesis-generating observations' only. There were 36 unconditional conclusions of superiority identified in the 25 published trials, all supported by a statistically significant P-value. However, only 15 (41.6%) of these conclusions also met the other two criteria. Of the remaining 21 conclusions, eight related to the primary outcome and 13 to secondary outcomes. Most of the eight primary outcomes were based on observed effect sizes that were smaller than the authors' pre-specified effect size used to calculate study sample size, while nearly half of the conclusions based on secondary outcomes were from studies where the primary outcome was negative. Gibbs and Weightman highlight the potential for inappropriate changes to clinical practice based on unconditional conclusions from insufficiently robust statistical evidence, together with the need for critical analysis and interpretation by readers of the medical literature. The play of chance is often under-appreciated in medicine. The Second International Study of Infarct Survival (ISIS-2) investigators reported an apparent subgroup effect whereby patients presenting with myocardial infarction born under the zodiac signs Gemini or Libra did not experience the same benefit from aspirin as those born under other zodiac signs 2 . Equally absurd, Greenberg et al reported a powerful association between the annual meeting of the Society of Pediatric Anesthesia and rain (odds ratio 2.63, P=0.006) 3 . The authors went on, tongue in cheek, to argue that the magnitude of the P-value mandated the potential link be taken seriously. In a delightfully well-written manner, Counsell et al 4 describe simulating trial results of a new therapy in their medical statistics class using the roll of a dice to represent the outcome for each patient. A six represented death while all other numbers represented survival. Each student represented a separate trial, rolling the dice a given number of times to represent study sample size. Despite using fair dice they observed enormous variation in results across studies including some impressively small P-values that, taken in isolation, might be considered compelling evidence for the efficacy of dice therapy.
The limitations, pitfalls and dangers associated with conclusions drawn from small studies, secondary endpoints and subgroup analyses have been well articulated [5] [6] [7] [8] . Limited total event number, absence of a pre-specified hypothesis, imbalance of prognostic factors between groups and an increased Type I error rate associated with multiple testing are the tip of the iceberg. Gibbs and Weightman draw our attention to two further issues of limited or unspecified power for detecting a difference in outcome as well as observed effect size relative to that specified as clinically important, both of which may influence the metric of reproducibility. While a given P-value correctly applies to the observed set of data in a study, it does not represent the probability of replicating the results should the same study be conducted again 9 .
So, how should we interpret the current study by Gibbs and Weightman? What evidence should clinicians require before altering practice and how do we guard against being seduced and misled by 'significant' P-values?
Firstly, clinicians and researchers alike need to be better educated about the use and limitations of inferential statistics. Such education should be ongoing as statistical methodology continues to evolve. It is imperative to understand that highly precise estimates of effect size (together with compellingly small P-values) achieved with large registry-type datasets do not eliminate confounding. In fact, recent commentary suggests that it is impossible to predict in which direction, and by how much, results from an observational dataset will differ from those obtained by RCTs 10 . Moreover, despite strong theoretical argument in their support, much-vaunted propensity scores used to analyse observational data show no clear improvement in agreement with RCTs to date compared to conventional methods of adjustment 10 .
Secondly, medical journals should enforce stringent requirements on methods of analysis and reporting of clinical studies. Many have already taken this step, requiring authors to report studies according to guidelines such as the Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials (CONSORT) statement for RCTs 11 . Similar guidelines exist for observational and other studies with adherence to recommendations required for prospective authors. To this end, Anaesthesia and Intensive Care has recently adopted and published journal-specific guidelines for statistical analysis, including those issues highlighted by Gibbs and Weightman in this issue. However, for such guidelines to be effective, journals need reviewers, editors and sub-editors to be well versed in such matters. Some journals within the specialty of anaesthesia currently employ a dedicated statistician with every study undergoing review prior to acceptance for publication. While prospective registration of a clinical trial is already a requirement for publishing in most journals the same mechanism to ensure a priori specification of planned analyses for observational studies is non-existent. While additional post hoc and various subgroup analyses of data can and should be undertaken, they should be clearly reported as exploratory and hypothesis-generating.
Thirdly, clinicians should maintain an appropriate level of skepticism, regularly asking whether chance (or bias or confounding) could explain the results of a given study. Studies should rarely, if ever, be interpreted in isolation. Rather, each study adds cumulatively to a body of evidence that should be interpreted in totality. Single-centre studies are inherently susceptible to unmeasured (and perhaps unmeasurable) centre-specific effects that may make replication elsewhere difficult. Myles et al 12 found evidence of a reduced incidence of major complications among patients receiving nitrous oxide-free anaesthesia in a large, multicentre RCT of nitrous oxide-based versus nitrous oxide-free general anaesthesia (odds ratio 0.70, 95% confidence interval 0.55 to 0.89, P=0.003). However, as a secondary endpoint in the context of no difference in primary outcome (hospital length-of-stay) the authors offered a suitably tempered conclusion that the use of nitrous oxide in major surgery "should be questioned". In the larger follow-up study specifically powered to address the composite endpoint of death and cardiovascular complications 13 the investigators found no difference in this outcome between groups (nitrous oxide versus nitrous oxide-free anaesthesia), highlighting the appropriateness of their earlier caution and need for suitable follow-up studies prior to drawing 'unconditional conclusions'.
Finally, when it comes to clinical studies it is important to remember that there is no such thing as proof. All studies are susceptible to the play of chance, let alone unrecognised bias and confounding. Nevertheless, the hardline or purist statistical stance of Gibbs and Weightman may tend to dichotomise study results, again oversimplifying the interpretation of clinical trials. It may be entirely appropriate to recognise a grey zone in trial results where, despite evidence being insufficient to meet the strict criteria argued as necessary for a 'valid conclusion', the perceived balance of risk and benefit justifies a practice change based on less robust findings. The Perioperative Ischemic Evaluation (POISE) Study was a landmark RCT of perioperative betablockade in 8351 patients with, or at risk of, atherosclerotic disease undergoing non-cardiac surgery 14 .
Patients were randomised to metoprolol or control with the composite primary outcome of cardiovascular death, non-fatal myocardial infarction and nonfatal cardiac arrest at 30 days after randomisation. Metoprolol reduced the primary outcome (hazard ratio 0.84, 95% confidence interval 0.70 to 0.99, P=0.0399) but was also unexpectedly associated with an increase in total mortality (hazard ratio 1.33, 95% confidence interval 1.03 to 1.74, P=0.0317) and stroke (hazard ratio 2.17, 95% confidence interval 1.26 to 3.74, P=0.0053). However, neither total mortality nor stroke were pre-specified secondary endpoints. The study was not powered (i.e. sample size was not calculated) to detect them. No clinically important effect size for differences in these outcomes was prespecified and the total number of stroke events was low (41 versus 19) with a Fragility Index appearing to be around seven, less than the number of patients lost to follow-up in the control arm of the study. Nevertheless, most patients who suffered a nonfatal stroke in the study were left severely dependent while a minority of those patients who had a nonfatal myocardial infarction developed heart failure, cardiac arrest or required revascularisation. Metaanalysis of POISE data along with five other trials of perioperative beta-blockers, reported as part of the main study, further supported the finding that perioperative beta-blockers increase the risk of non-fatal stroke (odds ratio 2.19, 95% confidence interval 1.26 to 3.78, P=0.005; I 2 =0%). While the data may not meet strict criteria to support a valid conclusion of increased stroke risk with perioperative beta-blockers, the combination of clinical severity of stroke versus myocardial infarction, together with a small but consistent effect across other studies, led to modification of both North American and European guidelines on perioperative beta-blocker use 15 . Nevertheless, the play of chance in these results cannot be totally discounted.
Understanding all of this, clinicians need to be comfortable living with a degree of persisting uncertainty, keeping an open mind while awaiting the next piece of evidence for integration into the decision-making process. Evidence-based medicine reconciles this necessary uncertainty, supporting current clinical decision-making on the best available evidence today, while simultaneously recognising the need for ongoing high-quality research that may lead to different decisions tomorrow.
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